Another criticism is that the potential for evil inherent in free will may be limited by means which do not impinge on that free will. God could accomplish this by making moral actions especially pleasurable, or evil action and suffering impossible by allowing free will but not allowing the ability to enact evil or impose suffering.  Supporters of the free will explanation state that that would no longer be free will.   Critics respond that this view seems to imply it would be similarly wrong to try to reduce suffering and evil in these ways, a position which few would advocate. 
If we assume that the host opens a door at random, when given a choice, then which door the host opens gives us no information at all as to whether or not the car is behind door 1. In the simple solutions, we have already observed that the probability that the car is behind door 1, the door initially chosen by the player, is initially 1 / 3 . Moreover, the host is certainly going to open a (different) door, so opening a door ( which door unspecified) does not change this. 1 / 3 must be the average probability that the car is behind door 1 given the host picked door 2 and given the host picked door 3 because these are the only two possibilities. But, these two probabilities are the same. Therefore, they are both equal to 1 / 3 ( Morgan et al. 1991 ). This shows that the chance that the car is behind door 1, given that the player initially chose this door and given that the host opened door 3, is 1 / 3 , and it follows that the chance that the car is behind door 2, given that the player initially chose door 1 and the host opened door 3, is 2 / 3 . The analysis also shows that the overall success rate of 2 / 3 , achieved by always switching , cannot be improved, and underlines what already may well have been intuitively obvious: the choice facing the player is that between the door initially chosen, and the other door left closed by the host, the specific numbers on these doors are irrelevant.